Canadian Military History
Volume 16

Issue 4

Article 8

2007

Fighting the Mujahideen: Lessons from the Soviet CounterInsurgency Experience if Afghanistan
Tony Balasevicius
Royal Military College of Canada

Greg Smith
Canadian Armed Forces

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh
Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation
Balasevicius, Tony and Smith, Greg "Fighting the Mujahideen: Lessons from the Soviet CounterInsurgency Experience if Afghanistan." Canadian Military History 16, 4 (2007)

This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more
information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Balasevicius and Smith: Fighting the Mujahideen

Fighting the Mujahideen

Lessons from the Soviet CounterInsurgency Experience in
Afghanistan
Tony Balasevicius and Greg Smith

T

he Canadian Forces currently in Afghanistan
as part of a NATO coalition are playing a
major role in a counter-insurgency campaign
directed against a resurgent Taliban threat.
Dealing with this menace will not be easy as
the Taliban, realizing they cannot defeat NATO’s
superior military strength, have resorted to
asymmetric actions that strike at the coalition’s
will through the cumulative effects of terror and
small-scale “hit and run” military operations.
Although NATO must contend with these
tactics, concentrating solely on the military
aspects of the problem will not address the
real danger.

The true nature of the Taliban’s threat rests
in its political strength and not in its military
capability. In order to destroy the Taliban’s
influence in the region a combination of
political, social, economic, and military means
are necessary. The complexities of dealing
with these issues in a coherent manner are
signiﬁcant, but in the case of Afghanistan there
is no precedent. Interestingly, the Soviets faced
many of these same challenges while ﬁghting
a counter-insurgency campaign against the
Mujahideen through much of the 1980s.1
The Soviet experience should be of
interest to coalition members as it provides
a contemporary example of the challenges of
conducting counter-insurgency operations
within that country. Contrary to popular belief,
the Soviets followed a logical and multifaceted, if
somewhat brutal, counter-insurgency strategy
in Afghanistan. A critical examination of the

Soviet performance reveals that many of their
failings can be directly attributed to a lack
of resources and in this respect, there are a
surprising number of similarities between the
operational environment the Soviets faced and
the situation that now confronts NATO. This
paper will explore aspects of Soviet counterinsurgency operations during their occupation
of Afghanistan, and assess strengths and
weaknesses relevant to current operations in
that country.2
*****

I

n the most basic terms, an insurgency can be
viewed as an uprising against an established
form of authority such as a government or
occupying military force. 3 Brad E. O’Neill
deﬁnes an insurgency as a “struggle between a
non ruling group and the ruling authorities in
which the non-ruling group consciously uses
political resources (eg. organizational expertise,
propaganda and demonstrations) and violence
to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of
legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”4
In this context, insurgences are often used by
the disaffected who recognize their inability to
win against conventional military forces and,
therefore, resort to actions that exploit popular
grievances and attack the will and motivation
of the status quo authority.5
Conversely, counter-insurgency operations
are carried out by the established authority and
seek to destroy the insurgent, in part through
political, social, and economic reforms to
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A Soviet riﬂeman in Afghanistan.

The genesis of Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan was the seizure of control in
Kabul by the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist organization, on
27 April 1978. The new government announced
a number of broad and ill-conceived reforms
that alienated large segments of the population,
and then did little to implement these reforms,
which also alienated those who might have
supported them. 9 Rebellion broke out in
the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan
and in the following months spread widely.
Increasingly, the PDPA relied on Soviet military
assistance, and in October 1979 was forced
formally to request Soviet intervention.

alleviate the same grievances the insurgents are
attempting to exploit. The established authority
must carry out reforms while simultaneously
attacking the physical entities of the insurgents’
military and political apparatus.6 Counterinsurgency forces must be very cautious in
their military actions, however, so as to limit
collateral damage to the population. That is
a very great challenge, as in many instances
insurgents attempt to embed themselves within
communities. Winning the “hearts and minds”
of the populace, therefore, is critical for both
the insurgents and the established authority.
The cooperation of the population provides the
basis for long-term operational sustainment
and is a key enabler in developing the other
conditions that are an essential precondition
for the success of insurgency and counterinsurgency alike.
In order for the established authority to win
“hearts and minds” they must ﬁrst be able to
show they can protect the population and defeat
the insurgents.7 As Lieutenant-Colonel John
McCuen points out, “the most important part of
a counter-insurgency is having the population
organized for its own self-defence…Even in this
early phase of the war, organization of local
auxiliary police and militia units should be
the ﬁrst priority of the governing authorities.”8
Establishing a secure environment within
Afghanistan was a critical ﬁrst step for the
Soviet counter-insurgency effort, but it proved
to be an extremely difﬁcult challenge for them
once they entered the country.

Although initially hesitant, the Soviets
eventually acquiesced and in December 1979
deployed the 40th Army, which consisted of
three motorized riﬂe divisions, an airborne
division, an assault brigade, two independent
motorized rifle brigades and five separate
motorized rifle regiments. 10 The Soviets
swiftly and efficiently took control of large
population centres and secured key lines of
communication,11 but paciﬁcation of the rural,
warrior society proved far more difﬁcult. Shortly
after the invasion, Afghanistan erupted into a
popular revolt against the occupying forces.
The Soviets were confronted by a number of
difﬁculties, including the formidable geography,
a fragmented society that held no allegiance
to a central authority, and a force structure
that proved ill-suited for counter-insurgency.12
The most signiﬁcant problem, however, and
one never rectiﬁed, was a lack of resources,
speciﬁcally adequate numbers of “boots on the
ground” to establish security.13
The Soviets deployed and maintained about
100,000 troops in Afghanistan. According to
American intelligence estimates, “An increase of
perhaps 100,000 to 150,000 men might [have
allowed] the Soviets to clear and hold major
cities and large parts of the countryside or block
inﬁltration from Pakistan and Iran, although it
probably could not do both…. An even larger
reinforcement of 200,000 to 400,000 men
probably would [have allowed] Moscow to make
serious inroads against the insurgency if the
efforts could be sustained.”14 There have been
a number of theories put forward as to why the
Soviets did not provide sufﬁcient manpower to
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Afghan soldiers were of extremely poor
quality and in most cases unwilling to ﬁght.16
Morale in many of the units was so low and
desertion to the Mujahideen so common that, by
August 1980, the Soviets were forced to remove
all anti-armour and anti-aircraft weapons from
Afghan units for fear they would fall into the
hands of the resistance. The incapacity of the
Afghan Army forced the overstretched Soviets
to assume additional duties. In so doing
the Soviets became the center of gravity for
success.17
Unable readily to improve and expand the
Afghan Army, the Soviets focused their efforts
on securing their hold on cities and major
towns.18 This was the most logical course, as
the Soviets could not realistically regain the
initiative until they had secured their own
strategic bases. Unfortunately, they never had
sufﬁcient resources to move beyond the major
cities as almost 85 per cent of the approximately
100,000 troops in theatre were needed for these
basic security tasks.19
The inability to expand control outside the
major centres proved costly as more than 80 per
cent of the country’s population lived
in rural areas and these people were
left vulnerable to the Mujahideen’s
inﬂuence.20 In this respect, a key
condition for success in the counterinsurgency effort appears to have
been forfeited from the beginning
of the campaign. Interestingly, the
failure of the Soviets to provide a
permanent security infrastructure
for the population did not deter
them from attempting to persuade

the people to stop supporting the insurgents.
In fact, Soviet methods to win the “hearts and
minds,” of the Afghans were quite sophisticated
and varied considerably depending on the area
they were targeting.
Shortly after the occupation the Soviets
introduced a number of reforms that were
designed to strengthen the relationship between
religion and state. They gave the government
in Kabul control of its own ﬁnances and this
included the distribution of endowments to
the country’s mosques. Religious leaders were
granted exemption from military service and
permitted a gratuity for visits to Mecca. These
concessions quickly won over the Afghan
mullahs who became an important source
of support as they preached that Islam and
Marxism sought a common goal and denounced
the activities of the resistance ﬁghters.21
Other “hearts and minds” initiatives
included having the Afghan state press
emphasize the government’s intention to
respect and observe Islam as a “sacred
religion.” In an attempt to showcase Afghan
independence the Soviets allowed the use of
the traditional Afghan ﬂag, considered land
reforms, attempted a rapprochement with its
former enemies and released a large number
of political prisoners.22
The Soviets also took a number of steps
towards creating a more homogeneous society
within Afghanistan by slowly moving the country
towards a Marxist philosophy. In this effort the
regime in Kabul made extensive changes to the
country’s education system. The curriculum
was modified to emulate the Soviet model
courtesy of Andrew Godefroy

meet the needs of the Afghan theatre. According
to declassiﬁed US military reports, the Soviets
believed,“that the primary purpose of [their]
intervention of December 1979 was to take
over security responsibilities, so that [Afghani]
government forces could concentrate on putting
down the ever-growing insurgency.”15 Although,
the Soviets may have initially expected the
Afghan Army to carry the main burden of the
ﬁghting against the insurgents, the idea quickly
proved unrealistic, at least in the short term.

Helicopters were essential to provide the
Soviets with mobility in a mountainous country
which lacked basic intrastructure.
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A portion of a circa-1985 Soviet topographic map of the Kandahar region.

through the use of translated Soviet textbooks
heavily laden with Marxist propaganda. 23
The government also rewrote ofﬁcial Afghan
history to reﬂect a more harmonious historical
relationship with the Soviet Union and replaced
all other foreign languages in Afghan schools
with Russian, which then became a prerequisite for advancement. Such techniques
were referred to as the “Russification” of
Afghanistan and sought, over the long-term,
to achieve Afghan paciﬁcation.24
Propaganda and psychological warfare
became a key aspect of the Soviet’s “hearts and
minds” campaign. In this respect the Russians
attempted to legitimize the regime in Kabul,
while undermining the insurgents’ belief in their
cause by targeting speciﬁc groups with different
massages. For example, efforts to win over the
more educated urban populations focused
on the beneﬁts of the Soviet presence. Radio,
television and print-media were used to portray
the Russians as heroes and defenders of Afghan
freedom and as historic friends to the Afghan
people. These means were also employed to
convince the urban populace of the security
of the Kabul regime, and often highlighted the
return of refugees from Pakistan to reinforce
this message.25
In the Hindu Kush mountain range area
of northern Afghanistan, the population

is ethnically linked with the peoples of the
Soviet Central Asian republics. The Soviets
distributed films and even promoted love
songs that highlighted these cultural ties, and
showed how the southern Soviet republics
had ﬂourished under Communism.26 However,
despite these efforts the Soviets were never able
to gain signiﬁcant support from the population
or to appreciably delegitimize the cause of the
insurgents.
This lack of success was due in large part
to the fact that the Soviets could not make
an impact in areas where they were unable to
establish a permanent security presence. Over
time, they found that any efforts to convince
Afghans in rural areas, particularly in the
south, of the legitimacy and beneﬁts of their
occupation proved to be useless and they
eventually ended all programmes aimed at
winning over the people in these areas.27 Instead,
the Soviets were forced to try gaining control
of the population by using what is commonly
referred to as the stick technique.28
There are several ways of employing the
stick technique, which can include minor
punishments such as “curfews, collective ﬁnes,
detention of suspects and various restrictions
on individual liberties.…One powerful ‘stick’
in the battle for local support is the use of
reprisals and harsh punitive measures applied
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A portion of a circa-1985 Soviet topographic
map of the Kabul region.

in the hope of making the populace more
frightened of the security forces then they
are of the insurgents.”29 Over the course of
the war such measures became a key part of
Soviet strategy in areas where the Mujahideen
had ﬁrmly established their authority. Unable
to put sufﬁcient forces into these areas, the
Soviets ruthlessly attempted to separate the
Mujahideen from the villages. Using Mao’s
metaphor that guerrillas are supported by the
population the way ﬁsh swimming in the sea
are supported by the water, the Soviet approach
in Afghanistan was to progressively empty the
water out of the bowl, thereby killing the ﬁsh.30
The Soviets used reprisal attacks and terror
causing what has often been referred to as
migratory genocide.31
This strategy was based on rapid retaliation
against any rebel attack on Soviet troops with
an overwhelming military response against
villages in the immediate area of the assault.32 In
certain rural areas where the rebel forces were
strong, the Soviets deployed heavy mechanized
forces with the simple goal of exterminating
the local population.33 During these operations
they destroyed the agricultural system upon
which the rural population depended. Irrigation
facilities, livestock, orchards, vineyards, water
wells and crops were actively targeted with
the express purpose of forcing civilians to
choose between ﬂight and starvation.34 After
one such attack a Swedish ofﬁcial reported:
“Russian soldiers shot at anything alive in six
villages – people, hens, donkeys – and then they
plundered what remained of value.”35
The scope of this effort and the results
were staggering. At the end of 1986, the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) estimated there were approximately
3.2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan with a
further 50,000 scattered in Europe, India and
the United States.36 Towards the end of the war,
it was believed that there were upwards of 5
million refugees in Pakistan and India, with a
further 2 million rural Afghanis seeking refuge
in Kabul and other Afghan population centres.
In their efforts to eliminate potential bases of
support, it is believed that the Soviets killed
as much as nine percent of Afghanistan’s preinvasion population.37

Although extreme, the Soviet emphasis
on eliminating bases and logistic support
of the Mujahideen through relocation is not
surprising.38 Insurgents need a secure place
from which to operate and where they can rest,
train, organize, draw supplies, and to provide a
centre from which to control operations. In fact,
the importance of bases and logistic support
to the insurgents should make these assets a
priority target for counter-insurgent forces.39
As the Soviets were unable to secure control of
many villages and thus eliminate their use by the
Mujahideen through occupation, they adopted
a policy of relocation through destruction.
The main difﬁculty with this policy was that it
backﬁred causing both international indignation
and increased local and international support
for the Mujahideen.
Significantly for the Soviets, these
counterproductive actions did little to address
the important problem of eliminating rebel bases.
This is because the Mujahideen had established
a number of secure bases or sanctuaries along
both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border
where they were able to regroup and continue
operations.40 Understanding the signiﬁcance of
these safe havens the Soviets made concerted
efforts to close the border area.41 Initially, they
77
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Top left: A Russian convoy defends itself against a
Mujahideen ambush.
Bottom left: The Soviets achieved greater success in
Afghanistan when they employed lighter, better trained
and more professional forces, such as the Spetsnaz troops
pictured here.

attempted to create government posts along
the Afghan-Pakistani border from which they
could launch attacks against Mujahideen
columns. This proved unsuccessful due to the
sheer length of the border, so the Soviets tried
ﬁnancially to co-opt border tribes to harass
the Mujahideen bands.42 When these efforts
failed, the Soviets started to carry out direct
actions on both sides of the border. Although
initially hesitant to violate Pakistani air space,
by 1986 the Soviets had become so desperate
they were striking all known rebel bases with
air and artillery attacks. It is estimated that
700 air and 150 artillery attacks were carried
out inside Pakistan during the latter part of the
war.43
In the end all measures to separate the
Mujahideen from their sanctuaries failed. Even
in 1986, which logistically was the worst year for
the Afghan rebels, the Soviets only intercepted
a third of supplies crossing the border.44 The
failure to destroy the sanctuaries allowed the
Mujahideen to continue to wear down the
Russians’ strength with the cumulative effects
of hit and run actions. To strike back at the
elusive enemy, the Soviets launched large-scale
military operations with their mobile reserves
on suspected rebel positions.45
Employing techniques that the Western
media often referred to as “Hammer and

Anvil” operations, the Soviets would establish
blocking positions and then conduct massive
mechanized sweeps intended to crush any
guerrillas that were caught between the two
forces. These large-scale operations, using
heavy mechanized forces, became a standard
counter-insurgency tactic for the Soviets
during the early part of the campaign. In the
long term, these tactics proved futile largely
because of the poor training of the soldiers in
these units and the fact that the tactics were
totally inappropriate for the conditions in
Afghanistan.46 Over time, the Soviets realized
the limitations of these actions and were able
to adapt their organizations and operations
accordingly. Moving away from their reliance
on motor riﬂe units they started focusing on
lighter, better trained, and more professional
soldiers that included airborne, air assault,
and special purpose (spetsnaz) forces. They also
introduced new types of formations including
mountain motor riﬂe battalions, and developed
training and tactics that focused speciﬁcally on
in-theatre operational requirements.47
Despite these reforms, which clearly
increased operational efﬁciency, the Soviets
were unable to achieve decisive results. These
mobile reserves did not operate in conjunction
with territorial units, police forces and local
militias organized and coordinated to provide
an essential security framework. As a result,
the Mujahideen were able to maintain their
mobility, and Soviet attacks often fell on empty
countryside, as the Russians were rarely able
to achieve tactical surprise or ﬁx the enemy.48
The Mujahideen’s control of the population
allowed them to develop an extensive network
of observers and messengers throughout much
of the country and this network maintained
an almost continuous watch over Soviet
movements.49 The Soviets, on the other hand,
were forced to rely on technical intelligence
provided by such means as aerial reconnaissance
and radio interception, and these sources often
failed to produce usable tactical information in
a timely manner. Moreover, since the ground
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Despite this success, the Soviet policy of
pitting the various Mujahideen bands against
each other proved to be of limited value.
Subversion tactics were often disrupted by the
same weaknesses they were trying to exploit,
the fragmented nature of the Afghan people.
“At the root of the Soviet difﬁculties,” noted one
military analyst, “military as well as political,
lies the fact that Afghanistan is less a nation
than an agglomeration of some 25,000 villagestates, each of which is largely self-governing
and self-sufﬁcient.”54 As one scholar put it,
“Much has been written about the lack of unity
within insurgent ranks, but little note has been
taken of the extraordinary difﬁculties that such
disunity poses to the counter-insurgent.”55

forces were always short of combat elements,
reconnaissance forces that could have provided
the badly needed human intelligence capability
that the Soviets lacked, were often tied down in
close combat duties.50
The Soviets did attempt to disrupt
rebel actions and gain information through
subversion, carried out by the Soviet intelligence
services using Afghan spies and collaborators.
Exploiting the fragmented nature of the
population, the Soviets were able to persuade
some villages to reach a truce and reject rebel
demands for logistic support. Such villages
were often found near major population centres
and would form their own militia groups that
protected the village and enforced law and order
within the community. In certain cases, rebel
groups were bribed into switching allegiances,
while tribal chiefs were paid off with land and
money to renounce support for the Mujahideen.
These techniques of co-opting the population
had the effect of creating “a stratum of people
in the countryside that have a vested political
and economic stake in the system and are likely
to defend it.”51

The Afghanistan War forced the 40th Army to
change tactics, equipment, training, and force
structure. However, despite these changes,
the Soviet Army never had enough forces in
Afghanistan to win. Initially, the Soviets had
underestimated the strength of their enemy.
Logistically, they were hard-pressed to maintain

courtesy of Andrew Godefroy

Subversion was particularly successful when
used to spread conﬂict and division among the
various resistance groups. Afghan society, and
the rebel groups it produced, were inherently
divded.52 The Soviets repeatedly attempted to
exploit these divisions and turn the groups
against each other. Agents were inﬁltrated into
rebel organizations to attempt assassination
of leaders, and spread disinformation in an
effort to create conﬂict among bands or to
discredit Mujahideen leaders. The fact that
the rebels acted independently and did not
possess modern means of communication
to verify information or resolve differences
made this technique all the more effective.
One Mujahideen leader stated that “the KHAD
(Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s secret
police) agents have rendered mujahed groups
completely useless by getting them to ﬁght
among themselves.” He added, “Why should
the Soviets worry about killing Afghans if the
Mujahideen do it for them?”53

Overcoming the disunity of the country
would have been a key step for the Soviets in
winning the counter-insurgency campaign, but
the reality on the ground was that they lacked
the resources needed even to start the process.
As General M.Y. Nawroz and Lieutenant-Colonel
L.W. Grau lament in their article “The Soviet
War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of
Future War”:

The Mujahideen enjoyed substantial international support
in the form of funding and weapons. Sophisticated items
such as Stinger ground-to-air missile took a heavy toll on
Soviet forces.
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a larger force and, even if they could have tripled
the size of their force, they probably would still
have been unable to win.56

The direct result of the insufﬁciency of “boots
on the ground” was the Soviets’ inability to
establish a permanent presence in the rural
areas where the majority of the population lived.
This single factor prevented the achievement
of the basic security conditions necessary
for winning the “hearts and minds” of the
people and without this support, defeat was
inevitable.

This lesson is the most signiﬁcant for NATO
forces currently in theatre. In a conﬂict where
“boots on the ground” are critical to setting
the conditions for success, the coalition has
only 40,000 soldiers currently deployed in the
country.57 This compares to the 100,000 troops
the Soviets deployed. To overcome the shortfall
of troops NATO will need to train effective
Afghan security forces in sufﬁcient numbers
to carry out the police and territorial defence
tasks needed to establish security throughout
the country, as well as providing some type
of mobile capability. Doing so could shift the
center of gravity for the conduct of operations
from NATO to the Afghan government. However,
without a signiﬁcant increase in troop strength,
NATO will not have the capacity to establish
the conditions necessary to influence the
population and if this cannot be achieved the
coalition is unlikely to create the operational
conditions needed for success in Afghanistan.
Another failure was the Soviets’ inability
to cut off the Mujahideen from their supplies,
especially along the border areas. This is the
same problem currently plaguing NATO forces.
The Soviets staged a well-organized
withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989
leaving behind a great stock of hardware.
Left and below: Guns lowered, hatches
open, Soviet tanks wait for crews that will
never return. The Tank Graveyard, a huge
locked compound near Kandahar Airﬁeld, is
full of deactivated Soviet armoured ﬁghting
vehicles, artillery pieces and trucks, all
parked in neat rows.
(Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre
IS2007-7466 & IS2007-7468)
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Unless the Taliban’s bases and sanctuaries are
identiﬁed, attacked, and destroyed they will be
able to continue ﬁghting even with signiﬁcantly
reduced numbers. This in turn will allow them
to continue striking at NATO forces, eventually
wearing down the coalition’s resolve through
the cumulative effects resulting from long
term ﬁghting. As a result, NATO and Afghan
national forces must eliminate Taliban bases
and sanctuaries, regardless of where they are
located. Moreover, destroying a large portion of
the Taliban’s infrastructure in one hard punch
offers the best chance of hurting the Taliban
sufﬁciently to buy the necessary time to get
the Afghan national security forces trained,
organized and in place for territorial defence
missions.
Finally, the Soviets’ inability to fix the
Mujahideen for decisive battle was due in part
to the fact that the Soviets placed far too much
emphasis on technical intelligence gathering.
The important lesson that should be noted from
this failure is that nothing can replace human
intelligence in counter-insurgency operations.
If NATO is to be successful in destroying the
Taliban and other insurgents, they must ﬁrst
be able to ﬁnd and ﬁx the enemy and to do
this they need to have excellent intelligence. To
achieve this, a network of informers needs to be
established throughout the country to report on
insurgent movements, which must be a priority
for the coalition’s intelligence capabilities.
Despite following a logical, multifaceted
counterinsurgency strategy that clearly
recognized the tenets for tactical and operational
success, the Soviets were hampered throughout
their campaign by a lack of resources. In the
end, this prevented them from denying the
insurgents any of their basic needs. Central to
the failure was the Soviets’ inability to secure
the country, allowing the rebels to operate
freely by maintaining bases, mobility, supplies
and information. In this respect, the Soviets
were unable to inﬂuence what increasingly
became a hostile population. Unable to sway
the rural populations through persuasion, the
Soviets turned to conventional military options
in an effort to contain the growing resistance.
When these methods did not work the Soviets
started using terror, which eventually turned
the population against them and removed

any trace of legitimacy from their involvement
in Afghanistan. Conversely, with the basic
conditions for survival in place, the Mujahideen
were, despite signiﬁcant casualities, able to
sustain a protracted conﬂict, eventually forcing
the Soviets to withdraw. Can NATO learn from
Soviet mistakes?
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